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1 “He shall judge the nations.” Psalm 110. 
2 J.D., Santa Clara University School of Law (2014); B.A. English, College of Humanities and Fine 
Arts at California State University Chico (2008); on motion for admission to the State Bar of 
California.  
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Introduction 
The problem of sex abuse of minors by Catholic clergymen is not unique to the 
United States.3  Although the problem seems to be especially endemic in the 
United States, where reports of clerical sex abuse are most prominent, accusations 
against the Church are an international issue.4  In countries with a strong Catholic 
tradition, the willingness to hold the Church accountable for sex abuse by priests is 
greatly diminished.5  Even within the United States, where separation of church 
and state is supposed to be a foundational constitutional standard, there are many 
legal roadblocks to effecting justice for victims of clerical sex abuse.  In the 
international realm, the anomalous, favorable treatment of the Catholic Church in 
its role as a sovereign state further obscures the answer as to who or what should 
be responsible for the alleged abuse.   
In the United States, these allegations have resulted in a handful of recent 
notable federal cases, two of which, O’Bryan v. Holy See6 and Doe v. Holy See,7 
were hinged on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).  Until these cases, 
the Holy See had not been named as a defendant or co-defendant in actions in 
which clerical abuse was alleged.8  The FSIA was a major hurdle for plaintiffs 
hoping to exercise jurisdiction over the Holy See in United States federal courts, 
and the arguments in O’Bryan and Doe are as problematic as they are novel.  
Ultimately, the outcome of these cases might be seen as a defeat for victims of 
clerical sex abuse, though they have value as test cases inasmuch as they urge us 
to find a new theory of the Holy See’s liability.  
Part I of this article examines the structure of the Catholic Church itself and 
offers a survey of how Canon Law prescribes how the church deals with sex abuse 
by clergy.  Part I.A seeks to highlight the Catholic Church’s broken chain of 
command by outlining how the regulatory structure of the Catholic Church 
facilitates a power imbalance that allows such abuses to continue, and creates a 
hierarchy that can color the connection between local priests and the Holy See as 
too attenuated to make the Holy See in Vatican City amenable to suit in the 
United States.  With regard to the effectiveness of the Church’s response to 
allegations of abuse, Part I.B illustrates how the broken chain of command taken 
together with the unacknowledged psychological implications of a priest’s vow of 
 
3. See Thomas P. Doyle & Stephen C. Rubino, Catholic Clergy Sexual Abuse Meets the Civil Law, 
31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 549, 589 (2004). 
4. Id. at 551. 
5. Id. 
6. O’Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2009). 
7. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2009). 
8. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F.Supp.2d 925, 938 (D. Or. 2006) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 557 F.3d 1066 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
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celibacy, imposed on clerics worldwide,9 render the Church’s attempts to protect 
parishioners from transgressing clerics a failure.  Part I.C illustrates how a priest’s 
vow of poverty further creates a loophole by which offending priests are rendered 
judgment proof, making a cause of action based on respondeat superior against the 
deep pockets of the Holy See appear to be the only viable option for victims. 
Part II examines the recognition of the Holy See’s sovereignty in international 
and United States law, as well as the implications of such recognition with regard 
to clerical sex abuse allegations.  Part II.A analyzes the governing structure of the 
Holy See against traditional notions of what properly constitutes statehood for 
purposes of sovereign recognition.  Part II.B examines the relationship between the 
United States and the Holy See as a foreign sovereign.  Moreover, it contains a 
broad discussion of the FSIA and its exceptions, giving special attention to the use 
of respondeat superior in the contentious cases of O’Bryan and Doe.  But in 
asserting an exception to FSIA immunity because of the Holy See’s alleged tortious 
acts, the question of whether local priests are, in fact, employees of the Holy See in 
Rome produced roadblocks that proved fatal to the interests of victims of clerical 
abuse.10 
Part III seeks to advance yet another alternative, completely separate from the 
FSIA.  Given the Catholic Church’s unique legal status,11 litigants may feel 
inclined to look to reasonable yet novel extensions of well-settled law.  The doctrine 
of superior or command responsibility,—which has previously been applied 
primarily in the military context, is recognized by the United States Supreme 
Court,12 and conforms to the norms of international law13—makes command 
responsibility a possible legal framework not only for victims in the United States, 
but in international courts.  Command responsibility provides an alternative for 
victims because it evades vicarious liability’s legal dead-ends by requiring a lower 
scienter standard,14 and it is seemingly universal in its applicability.  This theory 
poses problems, however, as courts may feel averse to extending the doctrine past 
its traditional military scope. 
 
9. 1983 CODE, c.277, § 1. 
10. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1087.  
11. See generally Matthew N. Bathon, The Atypical International Status of the Holy See, 34 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L. L. 597 (2001). 
12. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
13. See generally Edoardo Greppi, The Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility Under 
International Law, 835 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 531 (1999) available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/ 
resources/documents/misc/57jq2x.htm. 
14. See, e.g., Beth van Schaack, Command Responsibility: The Anatomy of Proof in Romagoza v. 
Garcia, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1213, 1217 n.13 (2003). 
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I. Church as Government 
A. A Broken Chain of Command 
It is essential to first understand the basic legal structures and chain of 
command within the Catholic Church.  The Church is divided between the clergy 
and laity.15  The clergy comprises the ordained men, and is further generally 
subdivided as follows (in ascending hierarchy):  priest, monsignor, bishop, 
archbishop, cardinal, and the Pope.16  The laity is comprised of the regular 
congregation.17 
Thus, in a legal sense the Catholic Church is a sacerdotal monarchy.18  Pastors 
and bishops are chosen by appointment rather than election,19 and the Pope 
assumes a position of supreme authority, in which legislative, judicial, and 
executive powers are vested.20  As monarch, the Pope is not subject to judicial 
scrutiny.21 
A contributing factor to the inherent power imbalance in the Catholic Church is 
the manner in which decisions are made.  Decisions of councils are merely 
consultative and require the approval of a cleric.22  Thus, power rests in high-
ranking individuals rather than groups. 
The Church is also divided and subdivided geographically into units that serve a 
jurisdictional function. The smallest unit is a parish, headed by one or more 
priests.23  Parishes are grouped into dioceses headed by a bishop.24  Dioceses are 
then grouped into archdioceses (or “ecclesiastical provinces”) headed by an 
archbishop (or “metropolitan” of an ecclesiastical province).25  The governmental 
organ of the Church as a whole is the Holy See in the Vatican, within Rome’s city 
limits.26  There are other nuances within this structure, but they are outside the 
 
15. Auguste Boudinhon, Laity, in 8 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1910), available at 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08748a.htm. 
16. William Fanning, Cleric, in 4 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1908), available at 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04049b.htm. 
17. Boudinhon, supra note 13. 
18. See State Departments, VATICAN CITY STATE, http://www.vaticanstate.va/content/ 
vaticanstate/en/stato-e-governo/organi-dello-stato.html  (last visited Apr. 9, 2015) (“Vatican 
City State is governed as an absolute monarchy. The Head of State is the Pope who holds full 
legislative, executive and judicial powers.”). 
19. Doyle & Rubino, supra note 1, at 558. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. See, e.g., 1983 CODE, c. 338, §1 (giving the pope the right of ultimate authority over all ecumenical 
councils). 
23. Id. cc. 515-52. 
24. Id. c. 374, §1. 
25. Id. c. 431, §1. 
26. Id. cc. 1442-45. 
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scope of this comment. 
The connection between a victim of clerical abuse and the Holy See is further 
attenuated when one considers that a bishop is generally given full legislative, 
judicial, and executive functions within his diocese without separation of powers.27  
Although a bishop is subject to the Pope’s authority, in practice, a bishop’s powers 
are subject to no checks or balances.28  Thus, the bishop’s power is effectively 
absolute, increasing the possibility of clerical abuse.29  It is important to keep this 
gap between the parishioner and the Holy See in mind when analyzing why the 
doctrine of respondeat superior failed. 
In 2001, Pope John Paul II promulgated in motu proprio30 the Sacramentorum 
Sanctitatis Tutela, which gives a council of clergymen called the Congregation for 
the Doctrine of Faith (CDF) the competency to consider a “delict against the sixth 
commandment of the Decalogue committed by a cleric with a minor below the age 
of eighteen years,” and to impose canonical sanctions.31  In other words, the CDF 
has the power to investigate allegations of sexual abuse of minors by priests and 
other clergy, and to punish offending clerics accordingly.   
It would appear, then, that the Catholic Church has taken a positive step 
toward addressing the allegations of victims.  Victims, however, view Church 
leadership to be ineffective on the issue.32  Stephen C. Rubino highlights the 
unchanged and problematic hierarchy of the church, especially the inherent 
clericalism that holds that members of the clergy have a special relationship with 
God, and therefore possess a greater moral authority than the laity.33  Rubino 
points out the alarming trend that both the clergy and laity conform to this view of 
clericalism, and because of this, victims of clerical abuse cite this perception of a 
cleric’s divine authority as a reason the abuse was not reported to civil authorities, 
regardless of whether the abuse felt “wrong.”34  Most victims of clerical abuse are 
 
27. Id. cc. 331-33; Doyle & Rubino, supra note 1, at 605 n.362. 
28. Doyle & Rubino, supra note 1, at 605 n.362. See 1983 CODE, c. 391 (granting bishops broad powers 
of administration over his diocese, without any real checks or balances from his superiors). 
29. Doyle & Rubino, supra note 1, at 558. 
30. An example of the Pope’s unequivocal authority, a written decree designated in moto proprio is 
one handed down by the pope on his own accord, without the consultation of cardinals or others. 
See Andrew MacArlean, Motu Proprio, 10 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1911), available at 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10602a.htm. 
31. John Paul II, Apostolic Letter, Sacramentorum Sanctitatis Tutela, art. IV, §§ 1-2, AAS 93 (2001), 
available at http://www.bishop-accountability.org/resources/resource-files/churchdocs/ 
SacramentorumAndNormaeEnglish.htm. 
32. Doyle & Rubino, supra note 1, at 555. 
33. Stephen C. Rubino, A Response to Timothy Lytton: Staunch Resistance to the Inclusion of Laity in 
Priest Discipline Has Stymied Permanent Change to the Structure of the Roman Catholic Church, 
39 CONN. L. REV. 913, 914-15 (2007). 
34. Id. at 915.   
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young adolescent males, and a significant minority is female.35  Most victims come 
from devout Catholic families with strong ties to the Church.36  Because of the 
close bonds that victims and their families have with their Church, there exists a 
pattern of unwillingness of parents and other adults to believe allegations of sex 
abuse by their priest.37  Allegations, therefore, may not surface until the victim 
reaches adulthood.38 
This unwillingness is not felt only at the individual level.  Stephen Rubino and 
Canon lawyer Rev. Thomas P. Doyle point out that while countries with a tradition 
of separation of Church and State have been at the forefront of exposing clerical 
abuse in civil courts, countries like Ireland, which have historical ties to the 
Catholic Church, have shown reluctance to, and even hostility toward, holding 
Church leaders accountable in cases of sex abuse by Irish clergy.39  Given the 
massive Catholic population worldwide, and especially because of missionary work 
in developing nations, clerical sex abuse is an international issue.40 
In the United States, when abuse is reported to Church authorities, victims are 
often told that the abuse will be investigated.41  When these victims become civil 
plaintiffs, however, discovery often reveals that victims were never informed of the 
outcomes of these investigations, if the investigations ever took place at all.42  
Canon Law, therefore, has been ineffective in providing remedies and relief to 
victims.   
The secrecy is not simply a consequence of the Church’s inaction or perceived 
subjugation of victims and their families; it is also explicitly decreed by the 
Vatican.  The papal instruction Crimen Sollicitationis is a set of procedural norms 
for hearing allegations of sexual misconduct by priests.43  Moreover, it grants the 
 
35. Doyle & Rubino, supra note 1, at 559-60. Doyle and Rubino also note that the gender ratio is 
inverted based on studies showing that most adult victims are female. See, e.g., A.W. RICHARD 
SIPE, A SECRET WORLD: SEXUALITY AND THE SEARCH FOR CELIBACY 265 fig.13.1 (1990). 
36. Doyle & Rubino, supra note 1, at 560. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 551-52. 
40. It is difficult to determine to what extent the problem exists in the Third World, as sex abuse in 
such countries is generally not talked about. On one hand, priests are held to a higher regard in 
the Third World, so they may be psychologically healthier. On the other hand, the church is more 
hierarchical, and therefore may be more difficult to challenge. See Michael Paulson, World doesn’t 
share US view of scandal: Clergy sexual abuse reaches far, receives an uneven focus, THE BOSTON 
GLOBE (Apr. 8, 2002), available at http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/ 
stories/040802_world.htm. 
41. Doyle & Rubino, supra note 1, at 559. 
42. Id. 
43. See generally Office of the Sacred Congregation, Instruction on the Manner in Proceeding in 
Causes involving the Crime of Solicitation, VATICAN POLYGLOT PRESS (Mar. 16, 1962), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/resources/resources_crimen-sollicitationis-1962_en.html (unofficial English 
translation of the original Latin text of Instructio de Modo Predendi in Causis Sollicitationis). 
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CDF jurisdiction over these cases.44  This decree also imposes a gag order on all 
parties involved—victims, their families, and witnesses.45  The Church’s remedy 
against parties who break this order is excommunication.46  
When such plaintiffs in the United States do eventually bring their claims to the 
civil courts, oftentimes their claims are settled.47  In the rare instances where such 
cases proceed past the trial level, plaintiffs hit a legal roadblock and their cases are 
dismissed.48  
B. The Church’s Ineffective Response 
A very basic discussion of the psychology of the perpetrators of clerical sex abuse 
is helpful to understanding the way Church leadership perceives and attempts to 
deal with the problem and why it is ineffective. 
The nature of abuse is a misunderstood aspect of the problem.  It is common to 
label the priests as pedophiles, whereas the more accurate term generally would be 
ephebophilia.  With pedophilia, either regressed or fixated, the perpetrator 
identifies emotionally and sexually with his victim.49  On the other hand, an 
ephebophile’s attraction indicates a higher degree of social and sexual 
development.50  The ephebophile is attracted to older children in the early stages of 
sexual maturation, and may even be unaware of the degree of coercion on his 
part.51  A priest, then, could be deluded into thinking the victim is a willing 
partner and deny that he has caused any harm.52  Pedophilia is listed in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, but ephebophilia is not, 
possibly because there are fewer diagnoses of ephebophilia, and patients are more 
 
44. Thomas Doyle, Commentary, The 1922 Instruction and the 1962 Instruction “Crimen 
Sollicitationis,” Promulgated by the Vatican ¶ 2 (Oct. 3, 2008) (unpublished paper), available at 
http://www.awrsipe.com/Doyle/2008/2008-10-03-Commentary%20on%201922%20 
and%201962%20documents.pdf. 
45. Id. ¶ 18. 
46. Since, however, in dealing with these causes, more than usual care and concern must be 
shown that they be treated with the utmost confidentiality, and that, once decided and the 
decision executed, they are covered by permanent silence . . . all those persons in any way 
associated with the tribunal, or knowledgeable of these matters by reason of their office, are 
bound to observe inviolably the strictest confidentiality, commonly known as the secret of the 
Holy Office, in all things and with all persons, under pain of incurring automatic 
excommunication. 
 Id. ¶ 11. 
47. Doyle & Rubino, supra note 1, at 551. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 560-61. 
50. Id. at 561. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
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likely to respond to treatment.53 
Many psychological symptoms, such as underdeveloped sexuality and emotional 
immaturity, were obvious traits of perpetrators according to studies such as those 
conducted by Eugene Kennedy54 and Dr. Conrad Baars.55 
A contributing factor to the perpetuation of the problem is the method of 
treatment at centers affiliated with the Church itself.  Although treatment centers 
were established for the primary purpose of rehabilitating offending clerics, 
bishops repeatedly misconstrued evaluations or ignored recommendations by 
mental health professionals.56  Instead, treatment continued to be founded on a 
medieval view of sexuality—a highly moralistic one, concerned with temptation to 
sin and the weak human will—rather than one based on current understanding of 
human sexuality and sexual dysfunctions.57  Consequently, clerics who underwent 
treatment at these centers often remained sexually and emotionally immature, 
and were returned to active ministry.58  
Another study suggests that bishops seeking psychological help were ignored by 
the American episcopate.59  Instead, the Church grew more defensive of clericalism 
and attempted to shift the attention away from the allegations, to perceived 
affronts from the secular media or civil processes.60 
These aspects of treatment highlight not only the ineffectiveness of Church 
leadership, but also the attenuation between the actions of the priest and the Holy 
See.  While one may deduce from various Church actions, such as the 
promulgation of the Sacramentorum Sanctitatis Tutela, that the Holy See knows 
or should know of the abuses by lower-level clerics, the power structure facilitates 
the Holy See’s ability to color the problem as an essentially local one.  This is the 
roadblock to plaintiffs attempting to name the Holy See as a defendant under 
respondeat superior. 
C. Judgment Proof 
Before Doe and O’Bryan, Michael Sartor proposed applying the doctrine of 
 
53. Doyle & Rubino, supra note 1, at 561. 
54. EUGENE KENNEDY & VICTOR HECKLER, THE CATHOLIC PRIEST IN THE UNITED STATES: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 80 (Washington D.C., U.S. Catholic Conference 1971). 
55. Conrad W. Baars, M.D., The Role of the Church in the Causation, Treatment and Prevention of the 
Crisis in the Priesthood 2, 4 (Nov. 1971), available at http://www.bishop-accountability.org/ 
reports/1971-11-Baars-TheRole.pdf. 
56. Doyle & Rubino, supra note 1, at 573. 
57. Id. at 570. 
58. Id. at 573. 
59. Id. at 569. 
60. Id. at 563. 
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respondeat superior to allegations of sexual misconduct by the clergy.61  Sartor 
identifies an essential consideration to support this application: courts must 
consider that the vow of poverty the Church imposes on its clerics renders such 
clerics judgment proof.62  Another important consideration is that respondeat 
superior spreads losses equally to the cheapest cost-bearer.63  These factors make 
respondeat superior especially attractive to victims wishing to bring a claim 
against an offending priest; even if the priest has taken a vow of poverty, the Holy 
See has deep pockets.64  Religious organizations may also purchase liability 
insurance in case of adverse judgments.65  
For vicarious liability under respondeat superior to attach, an employee-
employer relationship must exist.66  Sartor offers an in-depth analysis of various 
cases defining what constitutes the requisite employee-employer relationship, but 
confines his analysis to claims against dioceses and archdioceses, without 
considering the effect that this disparity may have when a case of clerical sexual 
abuse is brought against the Holy See as the employer of priests, as the plaintiffs 
in Doe and O’Bryan would soon do.   
Sartor was remarkably foresighted in citing the Oregon case Fearing v. Bucher 
to illustrate how a federal court must look to definitions of scope of employment as 
they apply to each state’s law of agency.67  What was not considered, however, was 
the potential for inconsistent rules of law when victims in the United States 
attempt to hold the Catholic Church in the Vatican liable by hailing it into the 
federal court system.  These issues will be discussed more in depth in Part II. 
 
61. See generally Michael J. Sartor, Respondeat Superior, International Torts, and Clergy Sexual 
Misconduct: The Implications of Fearing v. Bucher, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687 (2005). 
62. Id. at 724. Sartor also cites Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1077 (N.D. Iowa 1999), where a 
vow of poverty was a factor in considering imputed liability to a church for its tortfeasor 
priest. Id. at 724 n.206. 
63. Sartor, supra note 59, at 724. 
64. Id.  
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 700 (citing Greene v. Amritsar Auto Servs. Co., 206 F. Supp. 2d 4, 8 (D.D.C. 2002), where 
an employer-employee relationship was required to hold an employer vicariously liable for an 
employee’s acts). 
67. Id. at 690, 691. Sartor states that Bucher provides “the proper respondeat superior in all cases 
involving intentional torts, including sexual assault.” Id. at 691. His scope is limited, however, 
to claims against dioceses and archdioceses. The plaintiff in Bucher filed a tort lawsuit 
naming as defendants Franciscan priest Melvin Bucher and the Archdiocese of Portland 
Oregon, alleging that Bucher abused his fiduciary position by sexually assaulting Fearing 
when Fearing was a minor, and that the Archdiocese was vicariously liable for Bucher’s 
tortious acts because the Archdiocese was his employer. See generally Fearing v. Bucher, 977 
P.2d 1163 (1999). 
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II.  Church as Foreign Sovereign  
A. Defying Convention 
It is essential to understand the distinction between the Holy See and the 
Vatican.  The Holy See is a non-territorial entity comprised of the Pope and Roman 
Curia, and is the “supreme organ of government” of the Roman Catholic Church.68  
The Vatican, on the other hand, is the geographic city-state within the city of Rome 
ruled by the Pope.69   
Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention provides the classic definition of 
statehood: a qualifying state has (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined 
territory, (c) government, and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other 
States.70  The Church fails this test.   
Because the Holy See is defined as a governing organ, it has no population.71  
The Vatican, although it has about 400 citizens and 1000 inhabitants, has no 
permanent population.72  Citizenship is granted by the Pope,73 and is defined by 
one’s regular employment in the Vatican.74  Once citizenship ends by termination 
of employment or some other method of revocation, the individual’s citizenship 
returns to the original country of citizenship.75  Thus, there is no “Vatican 
nationality.”76 
Although citizenship is extended to the family of the employee, provided they 
live within the Vatican’s city limits, that citizenship ends for children when they 
reach twenty-five or, for daughters, when they marry.77  Therefore, without 
traditional notions of jus soli or jus sanguinis apparent in this arrangement, there 
is no population that is permanent, as commonly understood. 
Moreover, the Holy See lacks the characteristics one might typically associate 
with a government.  The Holy See is the administrator of the Roman Catholic 
Church, and has no “people” to oversee within Vatican City limits.78  Although 
there is a Pontifical Commission for the Vatican, this Commission oversees 
 
68. HYGINUS EUGENE CARDINALE, HOLY SEE AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 85 (1976). 
69. See Holy See (Vatican City), THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/vt.html (last updated Apr. 9, 2015). 
70. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 
19. 
71. Yasmin Abdullah, The Holy See at United Nations Conferences: State or Church?, 96 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1835, 1861 (1996). 
72. Id. 
73. Constitutional Laws of the City of the Vatican, Law No. 3, art.1. 
74. Id. art. 6. 
75. Abdullah, supra note 69, at 1861. 
76. Id. at 1862. 
77. Constitutional Laws of the City of the Vatican, Law No. 3, arts. 2, 4. 
78. Abdullah, supra note 69, at 1865. 
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logistical matters, e.g., the post, central security, the papal villas, and the Vatican’s 
radio station.79  The entity with the closest semblance to a government is the 
Roman Curia, headed by the Secretariat of State, which handles foreign affairs.  
Another division of the Roman Curia consists of nine Congregations, responsible 
for overseeing church doctrine and missionary work of the Roman Catholic 
Church.80  But the Holy See’s function is merely administrative, and hardly 
sufficient to be considered a government.81 
It has been noted that the fourth criterion—the ability to enter into relations 
with other states—is not a criterion at all, but a consequence of statehood.82  As 
such, the true inquiry is whether the state is independent.83 
On one hand, the Vatican is completely dependent on Italy.84  True, there is no 
size requirement for a state;85 the Vatican’s relatively tiny size, being completely 
within the limits of Rome, is more of a peculiarity than an exception.86  Indeed, all 
of the Vatican’s essential resources come from Italy: its police force, food, water, 
post, and telecommunications.87  It also has no economy and no domestic or foreign 
trade.88  Criminal prosecutions for the Holy See are also handled by Italy.89  As a 
practical matter, the Vatican is not independent at all, and theoretically, would not 
be able to enter into relations with other States under the Montevideo Convention. 
On the other hand, the Vatican’s independence is effectively by estoppel.  Per 
the 1929 Lateran Treaty, Italy recognized the Holy See’s full sovereignty, and in 
1984, “reaffirm[ed] that the [Italian Republic] and the Catholic Church are, each in 
its own order, independent and sovereign and commit themselves to the full 
respect of this principle . . . .90  The Vatican also has its own post office, railway, 
volunteer military (the Swiss Guard), publishing, and it also issues passports.91  
Independence is also substantiated by the recognition of the Holy See as a Non-
Member State Permanent Observer in United Nations Conferences.92 
 
79. Id. at 1865. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 1865-66. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Abdullah, supra note 69, at 1868 n.267. 
85. Id. at 1863-64. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 1867. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Lateran Pacts of 1929 (Lateran Treaty), art. 2, Feb. 11, 1929, available at 
http://www.vaticanstate.va/content/dam/vaticanstate/documenti/leggi-e-decreti/Normative-Penali-
e-Amministrative/LateranTreaty.pdf; Agreement Between the Italian Republic and the Holy See, 
art. 1, Feb. 18, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 1589. 
91. Abdullah, supra note 69, at 1865. 
92. Permanent Observers, Non-member States, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/members/ 
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Yasmin Abdullah rightly points out the inconsistencies in this arrangement.  
Although it has often been contended that the Holy See is the secular, political 
ruler of Vatican City, it is in reality impossible to bifurcate the Church, as the Holy 
See and the Vatican do not operate independently of one another.93  Moreover, it is 
unrealistic to call the interests of the Holy See, and therefore the Vatican, 
secular.94  The Vatican is merely the situs of administration for the Catholic 
Church—it furthers the Church’s interests rather than the interests of the 
inhabitants of an independent nation.95   
Abdullah further points to other anomalies produced by United Nations’ 
recognition of the Holy See.  Despite being a Non-Member Permanent Observer, 
because all “states” have the right to participate in United Nations conferences, the 
Holy See’s “statehood” allows it to participate along with Member States.96  
Moreover, because the United Nations favors consensus over votes, the Holy See 
may essentially hold the power of a quasi-veto.97  Another decision by the United 
Nations was to allow the Pope to address the General Assembly three times, when 
heads of Non-Member States are not typically able to make such addresses.98  
Thus, the status of the Holy See within the United Nations is exceedingly broad.99   
B. The United States and the Holy See 
1. The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) 
Sovereign immunity has been well established since the earliest years of United 
States.  The United States Supreme Court, as early as 1812, considered the issue 
of sovereign immunity in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.100  Justice 
Marshall’s opinion is a restatement of customary international law.101  McFaddon 
owned the private American ship Exchange, which was en route to Spain.102  
 
nonmembers.shtml (last visited May 15, 2015). 
93. Abdullah, supra note 69, at 1869. 
94. For a discussion on the impossibility of a secular Vatican City separate from the Catholic Church, 
see Abdullah, supra note 69, at 1867-71. 
95. Id. at 1868. 
96. See, e.g., United Nations, Rep. of the International Conference on Population and 
Development, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (1994), available at http://www.un.org/popin/ 
icpd/conference/offeng/poa.html. 
97. Abdullah, supra note 69, at 1844. 
98. Id. at 1844-45. 
99. The main thrust of Yasmin Abdullah’s note proposes that the Holy See is more like an NGO than 
a state, and should be treated as such at future UN conferences. Though this is a Sisyphean task, 
as realization of statehood is not revoked so easily, it could have implications for how the Holy See 
may defend itself from claims of child abuse under various imputed liability theories.  
100. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812). 
101. Id. at 146. 
102. Id. at 117. 
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France took Exchange at the order of Napoleon Bonaparte while sailing on 
international waters, and it was re-commissioned as the warship Balaou.103  
During a time of peace between France and the United States, the ship later sailed 
into the Philadelphia Harbor due to inclement weather.104  McFaddon initiated the 
case, asking the court to seize the Exchange because it had been wrongfully 
taken.105  The Supreme Court held that it had no jurisdiction over a friendly 
nation’s ship in American waters.106 
McFaddon is a reflection of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, which 
holds that a sovereign state cannot be subject to the courts of another sovereign 
state.107  The absolute theory, furthermore, extended to both the sovereign state’s 
private and official activities.108   
In the first half of the twentieth century, the competency to inquire as to the 
immunity of a foreign state typically belonged to the Department of State.109  In 
keeping with the American system of checks and balances, federal courts abstained 
from inquiring into the immunity of foreign states.110  During this era, the 
Supreme Court generally held that Article III courts would not examine the 
immunity of a foreign state because doing so would infringe upon the powers of the 
Executive Branch.111 
Due to increasing globalization and the outbreak of World War I, however, the 
Supreme Court required a more nuanced reading of sovereign immunity.112  The 
absolute theory began to evolve into a restrictive one,113 classifying the acts of a 
sovereign as either jure imperii or jure gestionis—that is, either a public act, or a 
 
103. Id. at 117-18. 
104. Id. at 118. 
105. Id. 
106. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 147 (“If the preceding reasoning be correct, the Exchange, 
being a public armed ship in the service of a foreign sovereign, with whom the government of the 
United States is at peace, and having entered an American port open for her reception, on the 
terms on which ships of war are generally permitted to enter the ports of a friendly power, must 
be considered as having come into the American territory under an implied promise, that while 
necessarily within it, and demeaning herself in a friendly manner, she should be exempt from the 
jurisdiction of the country.”). 
107. Jasper Finke, Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity or Something Else?, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 853, 858 
(2010). 
108. Id. 
109. Melanie Black, The Unusual Sovereign State: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and 
Litigation Against the Holy See for its Role in the Global Sex Abuse Scandal, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 
299, 313 (2009). 
110. Id. 
111. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (“[I]t is a guiding principle in 
determining whether a court should exercise or surrender its jurisdiction in such cases, that the 
courts should not so act as to embarrass the executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs.”).  
112. Black, supra note 107, at 313 n.107. 
113. Id. at 313. 
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commercial or private one.114  The importance of this classification is that a 
sovereign is immune only as to acts jure imperii, but not for acts jure gestionis.115  
This was problematic for the State Department, as it was now being asked to 
determine where an act was public or private, a fact question better suited to the 
courts.116 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act is a codification of the restrictive theory.  
The FSIA makes these considerations fall within the purview of Article III courts, 
rather than the Executive Branch.117  Further, it provides the courts with workable 
definitions, rules, and exceptions to apply.   
The FSIA applies only when a party sues a foreign state, including a political 
subdivision, an agency, or instrumentality of a foreign state.118  Agency or 
instrumentality means any entity which is a separate legal person, corporate or 
otherwise, and is either (a) an “organ of a foreign state or political subdivision" or 
(b) a "majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign 
state or political subdivision.”119  The Supreme Court, in 2010 in Samantar v. 
Yousuf further held that the FSIA’s language does not extend immunity to an 
individual who is a government official acting on behalf of a state.120  
Enunciating a rule based heavily on acta jure gestioni,121 the FSIA has a few 
exceptions to the general rule of immunity. The tortious activity exception is 
particularly relevant here.   
The tortious activity exception contains four elements: a sovereign does not 
enjoy immunity from a suit brought against it, where an injury is (1) committed in 
the United States (2) caused by an act or omission (3) by the foreign state or an 
employee or official of that state (4) when acting within the scope of 
employment.122 
There is, however, an exception to this exception,—the discretionary function 
 
114. Id. 
115. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (“Under international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of 
foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial property 
may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in connection with 
their commercial activities.”). 
116. See Black, supra note 107, at 313-14. 
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (“The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the 
claims of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests 
of justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United States courts. . 
. . Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United 
States and of the States . . . .”). 
118. Id. § 1603(a). 
119. Id. §§ 1603(b)(1)-(3). 
120. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010). 
121. Latin, lit.: acts by the law of business. H. VICTOR CONDÉ, A HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS TERMINOLOGY 5 (Board of Regents of the Univ. of Neb. 2004).  
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). 
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exception123—which reads as follows:  
The first inquiry is whether the challenged action involved an 
element of choice or judgment, for it is clear that the exception 
"will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy 
specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow." 
If choice or judgment is exercised, the second inquiry is whether 
that choice or judgment is of the type Congress intended to exclude 
from liability - that is, whether the choice or judgment was one 
involving social, economic or political policy.124 
The Supreme Court in Berkovitz reasoned that this framework of inquiry is to 
prevent “second-guessing” of legislative and administrative decisions, thereby 
protecting governmental decisions based on public policy.125 
2. The Cases 
Among the many cases brought against Catholic clergy, the two most notable to 
apply the FSIA to the issue of sexual abuse of minors by clergy were O’Bryan v. 
Holy See and Doe v. Holy See.126 
Originating in Kentucky, O’Bryan proved to be an interesting test case for 
applying the FSIA to the Church’s sex abuse scandal.  Whereas previous cases 
generally sought to hold accountable the diocese or parish in which the alleged 
misconduct occurred, O’Bryan named the Holy See as a defendant.127  Moreover, 
O’Bryan was a class action, brought against the Holy See on behalf of all 
individuals who were alleged victims of sexual misconduct as minors by Catholic 
clergy in the United States.128  It sought to hold the Holy See accountable under 
respondeat superior for its relationship to local bishops and for the bishops’ alleged 
negligent handling of priests accused of sexual misconduct.129 
 The court in O’Bryan found that the Holy See was a foreign sovereign under the 
FSIA,130 and addressed the tenability of the plaintiff’s claim that the Holy See’s 
immunity was limited by the tortious activity exception.131 
The complaint in Doe v. Holy See alleged that while serving as a parish priest in 
 
123. Id. § 1605(a)(5)(A). 
124. Vickers v. United States, 228 F.3d 944, 949 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted) (quoting 
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)). 
125. Id. 
126. See O’Bryan, 556 F.3d 361; Doe, 557 F.3d 1066. 
127. Lucian C. Martinez, Sovereign Immunity: Does the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Bar 
Lawsuits Against the Holy See in Clerical Sexual Abuse Cases?, 44 TEX. INT’L L.J. 123, 124 (2009). 
128. Class Action Complaint at 1, O’Bryan v. Holy See, 471 F. Supp. 2d 784 (W.D.Ky. Jan. 10, 2007) 
(No. 3:04CV338-H). 
129. Id. at 2. 
130. O’Bryan, 556 F.3d at 372. 
131. Id. at 379-83. 
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Armagh, Ireland, Father Andrew Ronan admitted to molesting a minor.132  
Thereafter, he was removed to a parish in Chicago, Illinois, and employed by the 
local bishop.133  While there, he molested at least three minors and admitted to the 
allegations when confronted.134  The bishop in Chicago, however, did not discipline 
or remove Father Ronan “in accordance with the policies, practices, and 
procedures” of the Holy See.135  The Holy See then transferred Ronan to a parish in 
Portland, Oregon, where he met the plaintiff.136  To the plaintiff, Ronan was a 
person of authority and spiritual influence.137  The complaint further alleged that 
Ronan used his position of trust and authority to engage in sexual contact with the 
minor Doe, and that such contact occurred on many occasions, including at the 
monastery and surrounding areas.138   
Doe brought suit against the Holy See, claiming, inter alia, respondeat superior 
liability against the Holy See through Father Ronan.139  The Holy See moved to 
dismiss the suit, arguing that it was immune from suit under the FSIA.140  The 
District Court found that the tortious activity exception made the Holy See 
amenable to suit for the respondeat superior cause of action.141 
In both cases, the circuit courts of appeals accepted the sovereignty of the Holy 
See as a foreign state within the meaning of the FSIA.142  But given the sui generis 
nature of the Holy See, the tortious activity exception is where courts ended up in a 
legal quagmire.  The power structure obscures the question as to whether the 
Church in Vatican City truly controls the actions of lower level clerics.  Canon Law 
is explicit that the Pope retains total control of all clerics.143  But as stated in Part 
I, in practice, this control is rarely used, and bishops have almost complete control 
over personnel matters in their dioceses.144  Therefore, as to the question of 
whether the act or omission happened in the United States, reasonable minds may 
differ on whether causation is imputed to the Holy See abroad or to the allegedly 
 
132. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1069-70. 
133. Id. at 1072. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 1070. 
136. Id. 
137. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1070. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 1069. 
140. Id. at 1071. 
141. Id. 
142. Doe, 434 F.Supp.2d at 933 (“[T]he sovereign status of the Holy See is not in dispute.”); O’Bryan, 
556 F.3d at 372 (“[T]here is no dispute that the United States recognized the Vatican in 1984, and 
there is no dispute between the parties that the State of the Vatican is a foreign state within the 
meaning of FSIA.”). 
143. 1983 CODE, c.331. 
144. See supra note 26. 
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negligent omissions of bishops in the United States.  But even if a bishop in the 
United States is responsible for the omission, if that bishop is a United States 
citizen, can he still be considered an “agent or instrumentality” of a foreign state, 
regardless of whether he takes orders from that foreign state?145  This murkiness 
may offend one’s sense of justice, in that it appears that it allows a superior to 
retain his authority on paper and exercise it at will but simultaneously deny such 
power ad hoc, as to evade responsibility for the wrongdoings of his subordinates by 
relying on the practice of maintaining the attenuation of power in his government’s 
hierarchy. 
Another problem is whether the state law considers sexual misconduct to be 
within the “scope of employment” umbrella.  While in Kentucky sexual misconduct 
is not considered within the scope of employment,146 other states, such as Oregon, 
hold to the principle that the test may be satisfied if the intentional tort was 
sufficiently related to conduct that was within the scope of employment.147  
Given this messy legal situation, it is unlikely that any stable rule relating to 
the responsibility of the Catholic Church broadly for the sexual abuse of minors by 
priests will result from reliance on the tortious activity exception to the FSIA. 
III. Church as Commander 
William Jacob Neu proposes an alternative test to respondeat superior liability.  
This new test is innovative in that it extends an already existing doctrine within 
American law, which, because it is based on principles of jus cogens in 
international law, may also be a workable framework in the international context.  
This expansion of the command responsibility doctrine, however, is not without its 
own issues.   
 
145. See, e.g., O’Bryan, 471 F.Supp.2d. at 791 n.3 (“[T]he Archdiocese of Louisville is certainly not an 
‘agency or instrumentality’ of a foreign state, because it is clearly a citizen of Kentucky, as it is 
organized as a Kentucky corporation. Therefore, while this Court concludes that, for instance, the 
Archbishop of Louisville is an ‘employee’ of the Holy See for the purposes of Kentucky law, the 
entity over which he presides-the Archdiocese of Louisville-is not an agency or instrumentality of 
the Holy See.”). 
146. See, e.g., Osborne v. Payne, 31 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Ky. 2000) (“A principal is not liable under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior unless the intentional wrongs of the agent were calculated to 
advance the cause of the principal or were appropriate to the normal scope of the operator’s 
employment.”); O’Bryan, 556 F.3d at 383 (“[T]he Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that a priest's 
adulterous conduct could not be considered within the scope of his employment, even though the 
underlying conduct was intentional.”). 
147. See, e.g., Bucher, 977 P.2d at 1165-66 (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is 
liable for an employee’s torts, including intentional torts, if the employee was acting within the 
scope of employment.”) (emphasis added). 
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A. Liability for Crimes Against Humanity in International Law 
The command responsibility doctrine is an old one.  Evidence of the principle 
can be found as far back as biblical texts.  Book 1 of Kings, Chapter 21, recounts 
the story of Queen Jezebel commanding certain inhabitants of the Samaria, 
including elders and nobles, to frame a man named Naboth of the crime of 
blasphemy, whereby he would be stoned to death.  Though the command was not 
directly from the King of Samaria, Ahab, he was nonetheless held responsible for 
the homicide as sovereign ruler over those in Samaria.148 
  The first trial based on the command responsibility doctrine, however, was 
the trial of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474.149  At issue was the application of fault 
considering the accused’s compliance with superior orders.150  The Duke of 
Burgundy charged Hagenbach, a Germanic military commander, with the 
administration of the fortified city of Breisach.151  As governor, Hagenbach acted 
on the Duke’s orders to the extreme, brutally and violently ruling the inhabitants 
of Breisach into submission through methods such as murder, rape, and illegal 
seizing of property.152 
The Archduke of Austria, having captured Breisach, put Hagenbach on trial 
before an ad hoc tribunal.153  Reflecting the makeup of the Holy Roman Empire of 
at the time, the tribunal took on an international character, mirroring modern 
tribunals: it comprised 28 judges representing a coalition of allied states and 
towns.154  As a defense, Hagenbach contended that he took orders solely from the 
Duke of Burgundy, who also confirmed and ratified the atrocious measures taken 
by Hagenbach.155 
The concept of command responsibility reached the Executive Branch of the 
United States government during the American Civil War.  The Lieber 
Instructions, signed by President Abraham Lincoln on April 24, 1863, is arguably 
the first modern written statement of the law of war, helping to inform the 1907 
Hague Convention and 1949 Geneva Conventions.156  Specifically, the Lieber 
 
148. 1 Kings 21:1-28 (New Int’l Version). 
149. Greppi, supra note 11. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Greppi, supra note 11. 
155. Id. 
156. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders No. 
100 (Apr. 24, 1963), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 3 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri 
Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988), available at https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/ 
domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/A25AA5871A04919BC12563CD002D65C5/FULLTEXT
/IHL-L-Code-EN.pdf [hereinafter Lieber Instructions]; see also Instructions for the Government of 
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Instructions imposed criminal liability on commanders who ordered subordinates 
to kill or wound disabled enemies.157 
The 1907 Hague Convention codifies the principal that a superior is accountable 
for the actions of his subordinates in the multinational context.158  The first explicit 
codification of command responsibility was the 1977 Additional Protocol 1 (AP1) to 
the 1949 Geneva Convention.159  Per AP1, the wrongdoing of a subordinate does 
not absolve the superior from responsibility.160  AP1 also provides a workable test 
for scienter, attaching liability to the superior if he had reason to know a prohibited 
act occurred or was about to occur.161  Therefore, the superior’s knowledge need not 
be actual; it may be constructive.    
The United States Supreme Court in In re Yamashita affirmed the Military 
Commission’s decision finding Yamashita, a commanding general in the Japanese 
army during World War II, guilty of failing to discharge his duty as a military 
commander by permitting his subordinates to commit war crimes while stationed 
in the Philippine Islands.162  Thus, this was the first instance where a superior was 
held liable under command responsibility for an omission.   
Arce v. Garcia163 and its sister case Ford ex rel. Estate of Ford v. Garcia164 
considered the liability for two El Salvadorian defense ministers for the torture of 
Salvadorian civilians.  In Ford, the district court instructed the jury that in order 
to find a defendant guilty under command responsibility, a plaintiff must show by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant: (1) had effective command 
over persons who committed torture or an extrajudicial killing, (2) knew or had 
reason to know that his subordinates were committing torture or an extrajudicial 
killing, and (3) failed to take reasonable and necessary steps to prevent or stop his 
subordinates.165  The jury instructions further define “effective command” as 
requiring the superior to “[have] the legal authority and the practical ability to 
exert control over his troops.”166  
 
Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code). 24 April 1863., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/110?OpenDocument (last visited May 15, 2015). 
157. Lieber Instructions, art. 71.   
158. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land ch.1, art. 1, §1, Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2277, U.S.T.S. 539. 
159. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
160. Id. art. 86(2). 
161. Id. 
162. See generally Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1. 
163. Arce v, Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2006). 
164. Ford ex rel. Estate of Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2002). 
165. Id. at 1287 n.3. 
166. Id. 
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It would be beyond the scope of this comment to survey the vast body of World 
War II case law, but because of the consistency in which the doctrine is applied to 
crimes against humanity, command responsibility has been established as a norm 
of customary international law.167 
B. Command Responsibility and the Church 
1. In American Courts 
The primary benefit to command responsibility is that it avoids the 
uncomfortable prospect of hailing a foreign sovereign into an American court and 
analyzing the controversy through a decidedly American lens; i.e., applying various 
and sometimes contradictory American interpretations of respondeat superior and 
agency to a sovereign.  Because command responsibility arises out of customary 
international law and peremptory norms from which no derogation is permitted, it 
puts the United States and the Holy See at a fairly equal legal understanding.  The 
universality of command responsibility means that an American court should be 
able to apply this doctrine to the Holy See at a lower risk of infringing upon its 
sovereignty.  This doctrine relieves courts of having to navigate the legal 
quagmires inherent in the respondeat superior theory, as it does not matter 
whether the subordinate falls under the defendant’s direct or indirect authority; 
that the subordinate is merely within the defendant’s chain of command is 
sufficient.168  Thus, the attenuation of command is less useful to the Holy See. 
In advancing the application of command responsibility to the Catholic Church, 
William Jacob Neu draws interesting parallels between the Church and 
military.169  First, they have a similar chain of command.170  Priests are analogous 
to privates, and bishops to lieutenants or generals.171  Like a general, a bishop may 
have considerable authority over a geographic region, but is nonetheless 
answerable to individuals overseeing the global operations.172  Second, both 
systems have their own tribunals to investigate crimes separate from civilian 
 
167. For a list of cases interpreting the doctrine of command responsibility, see 1 MARIE HENCKAERTS 
& LOUIS DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 558-62 (2005), 
available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-
law-i-icrc-eng.pdf; see also id. at 559 (“State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary 
international law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.”).  
168. See, e.g., People v. Aleksovski, Case. No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment, Tr. Chamber, ¶ 106 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 25, 1999). 
169. See Jacob William Neu, “Workers of God”: The Holy See’s Liability for Clerical Sex Abuse, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 1507 (2010). 
170. Id. at 1538. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
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courts.173  
Focusing on American courts, it is relatively simple to parse the general factual 
patterns of clerical sex abuse through the elements of command responsibility 
enunciated in Ford, and slightly modified to fit a non-military controversy. 
(1) It is clear that the Holy See had “effective control” over the actions of bishops 
and even priests.  The Church’s Canon Law is explicit about the Holy See’s 
reservation of absolute authority over clerics.  The Sacramentorum Sanctitatis 
Tutela, the Crimen Solliciationis, and even the Pope’s recent demotions,174 
laicizations,175 and excommunications176 of archbishops, bishops, and priests 
further support a finding of the Holy See’s potential for control.  Whether the Holy 
See in fact has used that discretion on lower level clerics should be immaterial.  
The gap in the chain of command between bishops and their superiors is likewise 
immaterial.  What matters is that the Holy See may use this power when it 
desires.  This effective control requirement is therefore an easier standard to meet 
than the scope of employment test. 
(2) The Holy See knew or had reason to know its subordinate clerics were 
committing crimes against humanity.  The very existence of the CDF, 
Sacramentorum, and Crimen evince the Holy See’s knowledge of the problem.  
Applying this standard to cases like Doe, it is rather obvious, assuming the 
allegations in Doe’s complaint to be true, that the Holy See knew of an offending 
priest’s dangerous proclivities, as the Holy See itself was involved in placing 
Father Ronan in new parishes following complaints of his sexual misconduct with 
minor boys.177  Thus, the Holy See does not simply have a reason to know of the 
abuse, it has met the higher standard for actual knowledge. 
(3) The Holy See failed to take reasonable and necessary steps to prevent or stop 
its subordinate clerics from engaging in sexual misconduct with minors.  The 
various studies of the ineffectiveness of Church-affiliated rehabilitation facilities 
for offending priests cited above, the relocation of offending priests, unwillingness 
to notify and cooperate with civil authorities, destruction of evidence, and tendency 
 
173. Id. 
174. See, e.g., Sara Lin Wilde, Pope Francis Demotes Cardinal who Denied John Kerry Communion, 
PATHEOS (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/friendlyatheist/2013/12/18/pope-francis-
demotes-cardinal-who-denied-john-kerry-communion. 
175. See, e.g., Teczar Laicized by Pope, CATHOLIC FREE PRESS (Sept. 9, 2011, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.catholicfreepress.org/local/2011/09/09/teczar-laicized-by-pope/ (describing Pope 
Benedict XVI’s removal from the priesthood of a Texas man accused of molesting a minor). 
176. See, e.g., Hunter Stuart, Pope Francis Excommunicates Australian Priest Who Advocated for Gay 
Marriage and Female Clergy, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 24, 2013, 4:42 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/24/pope-francis-excommunicates-priest-greg-
reynolds_n_3983059.html. 
177. Doe, 557 F.3d at 1070. 
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to deflect blame onto the victims, civil processes, and secular media, are evidence of 
the Holy See’s failure under this element.  This element also provides a stronger 
foothold in cases like Doe, where the causes of action for negligent hiring and 
retention,178 and for the Holy See’s failure to warn the plaintiff of the priest’s 
harmful sexual proclivities were defeated.179 
Neu, however, does not consider that the jurisprudence on command 
responsibility, whether American or not, involves persons as defendants, rather 
than governing organs of sovereign states.  The extension of command 
responsibility to the issue of clerical sex abuse should therefore be tempered; while 
such a claim might be workable against individual high-level Vatican officials, the 
practice of naming the entire governing body of a sovereign state probably strays 
too far from the modern understanding of command responsibility. 
Neu relies on Romagoza v. Garcia to argue that American courts have expanded 
command responsibility to cover civil tort cases.180  But Garcia involved torture of 
civilians by military commanders.181  What Neu leaves to be elaborated upon is 
whether and to what extent command responsibility may be applied to civilian 
defendants for their actions when in a role analogous to that of a military superior. 
There are at least two international criminal tribunal cases that would square 
with Neu’s thesis, as they involve civilians held liable under command 
responsibility.  In Prosecutor v. Musema, Chamber I of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda found Musema, an influential director of a major tea factory, 
guilty of genocide and rape, among other offenses, under the doctrine of command 
responsibility through the actions of his employees.182  The Chamber held that “a 
civilian superior may be charged with superior (command) responsibility only 
where he has effective control, be it de jure or merely de facto, over persons 
committing violations of international humanitarian law.”183  In Prosecutor v. 
Aleksovski, the Chamber for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia considered the defendant Zlatko Aleksovski, a civilian commander of a 
prison facility in Bosnia during the Bosnian War, to have had effective authority 
over subordinate prison guards who subjected many detainees to inhumane 
 
178. Id. at 1069. 
179. Id. at 1085 (“[T]he tortious act exception does not provide jurisdiction over Doe’s negligent 
hiring, supervision, and failure to warn claims because they are barred by the discretionary 
function exclusion.”). 
180. Neu, supra note 167, at 1537 (“An American court has also applied the command 
responsibility doctrine in a civil case involving international tort claims.”). 
181. Id. 
182. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment of the ICTR Chamber, ¶ 880 (Jan. 27, 
2000). 
183. Id. ¶ 141. 
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treatment.184   
While expansion of command responsibility to tort and—in the international 
realm, at least—to civilian defendants has been tried and tested, the fact that 
these cases name natural persons as defendants is a distinguishing factor that 
would be a significant obstacle to any American plaintiff hoping to use Neu’s 
approach against the Holy See.  
2. Before the International Criminal Court 
Focusing now on the international context, command responsibility also seemed 
a tenable claim against high-level Vatican officials in the International Criminal 
Court (ICC).185  The ICC prosecutor’s rejection in June 2013 of a request for an 
investigation on behalf of victims of clerical sex abuse,186 however, evinces the 
concern some international courts may have with Neu’s proposition to extend 
command responsibility outside of military contexts.  
The ICC has the capacity to prosecute individuals,187 making a claim against 
the Holy See impossible.188  The plaintiffs here, therefore, brought their claims 
against high-ranking Vatican officials, including Pope emeritus, Benedict XVI.189  
The ICC has the competency to hear cases of crimes against humanity.190  The 
ICC Statute enumerates some acts triggering inquiry, including rape, sexual 
slavery, and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.191  The ICC 
Statute also outlines the two-part inquiry: (1) the act must be part of a widespread, 
systemic attack (2) directed against any civilian population.192 
On September 13, 2011, the Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests 
 
184. See Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, supra note 166, ¶ 90-107.  
185. Victims’ Communication Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute Requesting Investigation 
and Prosecution ofHigh-level Vatican Officials forRape and Other Forms of Sexual 
Violence as Crimes Against Humanity and Torture as a Crime Against Humanity, ICC File 
No. OTP-CR-159/11, at 2-3 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at 
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/ 243877/victims-communication.pdf [hereinafter ICC 
Complaint]. 
186. Rachel Zoll, Pope Benedict XVI International Criminal Court Investigation Requested by Clergy 
Sex Abuse Victims Rejected, THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 13, 2013, 2:33 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/13/pope-benedict-international-criminal-court_n_ 
3436720.html. 
187. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(1), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf 
[hereinafter ICC Statute] (“The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to 
this Statute.”) (emphasis added). 
188. Id. art. 25(4) (“No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall 
affect the responsibility of States under international law.”). 
189. ICC Complaint, supra note 183, at 55-57. 
190. ICC Statute, supra note 185, art. 5(b). 
191. Id. art. 7(1)(g). 
192. Id. art 7(1). 
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(SNAP) filed a lengthy complaint, supported by expert declarations and exhibits 
illustrating the worldwide nature of the problem.193  SNAP asserted that the 
Church’s practices and policies amounted to a crime against humanity within the 
meaning of the ICC Statute.194 
The arguments advanced in the complaint are heavily informed by command 
responsibility’s corollary, superior responsibility.  The complainants rely on Article 
28(b) of the ICC Statute, which, although pertaining to non-military superiors, is 
analytically identical to the Ford test for command responsibility above.195 
The tribunal, however, rejected the request with a letter to the Center for 
Constitutional Rights, which represented SNAP, stating, “The matters described in 
your communication do not appear to fall within the jurisdiction of the court.”196  
The letter further clarified that the ICC may only investigate “the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, namely genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes,” and that SNAP and the Center for 
Constitutional Rights did not meet these requirements.197 
In response to this development, Jeff Lena, an attorney for the Vatican, stated, 
in reference to the long line of high-profile cases about clerical sex abuse, that the 
“common thread” was the “mistaken idea that everything is controlled by Rome.”198  
The statement highlights how the attenuation of command has become a windfall 
to the Holy See, under both respondeat superior and command responsibility 
theories.   
3. Before the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
The SNAP complaint may have at least raised international awareness on the 
issue, but the institutionalized clericalism and secrecy of the Catholic Church has 
rendered the latest inquiries against the Church fruitless.  Neu advocated the use 
 
193. See ICC Complaint, supra note 183. 
194. Id. at 61-69. 
195. ICC Statute, supra note 185, art. 28(b). Article 28(b) provides that a superior:  
[S]hall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed 
by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her 
failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where: 
(i)  The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicat-
ed, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes, 
(ii)  The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control 
of the superior; and  
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her 
power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent au-
thorities for investigation and prosecution. 
196. Zoll, supra note 184. 
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of the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC), to which the Holy See is a 
signatory, as a basis for holding the Holy See accountable for infringing a child’s 
basic human rights.199   In July 2013, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
issued to the Holy See a series of questions regarding its adherence to the CRC.200  
Of particular relevance is Question 11, which inquires in relevant part: 
In the light of the recognition by the Holy See of sexual violence 
against children committed by members of the clergy, brothers and 
nuns in numerous countries around the world, and given the scale 
of the abuses, please provide detailed information on all cases of 
child sexual abuse committed by members of the clergy, brothers 
and nuns or brought to the attention of the Holy See over the 
reporting period.201 
The document further questions the Holy See on “the type of support and 
protection provided by the Holy See to child victims,” information on the Holy See’s 
cooperation with civil authorities, measures taken to sever contact between 
children and offending clergy, and other statistical information.202 
The Holy See’s response, however, evinces the Church’s clericalism and secrecy.  
The answers to Question 11 were vague, subjective, conclusory, or deflective.  For 
example, in response the Committee’s inquiry about “cooperation provided by the 
State party proceedings engaged in countries where the abuses were committed,” 
the Holy See responded: “[R]espect should be shown a) for civil laws, such as re-
porting obligations; b) for the person who reports the delict of clerical sexual abuse 
of a minor; and c) for the right to request that his or her name not be known to the 
priest denounced.”203 
It is difficult to see how this answer, the vagueness of which is representative of 
the accompanying answers, provides the Committee sufficient information as to 
the Holy See’s compliance or non-compliance with the CRC.  In keeping with the 
Holy See’s refusal of transparency on the issue of sexual misconduct, Answer 11.4 
states in relevant part: “it is not the practice of the Holy See to disclose information 
on the religious discipline of members of the clergy or religious according to canon 
law.”204   
 
199. Neu, supra note 167, at 1539. 
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This latest development reiterates the Holy See’s ability to utilize its sui generis 
status in the international arena to justify secrecy and avoid meaningful 
cooperation, while frustrating victims’ sense of justice.   
Conclusion 
While Doe and O’Bryan tread on new ground, the attempt to hold the Holy See 
liable under respondeat superior against the Holy See’s claim of immunity under 
the FSIA proved to be a Sisyphean task.  Plaintiffs simply could not escape the 
questions of employment and agency in attempting to overcome the Holy See’s 
claim of immunity.  
Because the doctrine of command responsibility, as proposed by Neu, is firmly 
ensconced in universal jus cogens norms of international law, restated in American 
case law, and codified in international agreements, it may provide a more workable 
legal framework upon which victims of sex abuse by Catholic clergy can rely.  The 
extension of command responsibility to a non-military defendant, however, can be 
an obstacle to Neu’s proposition if the ICC’s recent decision is any indication of how 
far courts elsewhere are willing to extend command responsibility’s reach.   
 
